Theory in North American archaeology is characterized in terms offoci and approaches manifested in research issues, rather than in explicit or oppositional theoretical positions. While there are some clear-cut theoretical perspectives-evolutionary ecology, behavioral archaeology, and Darwinian archaeology-a large majority of North American archaeology fits a broad category here called "processual-plus." Among the major themes that crosscut many or all of the approaches are interests in gender, agency/practice, symbols and meaning, material culture, and native perspectives. Gender archaeology is paradigmatic ofprocessual-plus archaeology, in that it draws on a diversity of theoretical approaches to address a common issue. Emphasis on agency and practice is an important development, though conceptions of agency are too often linked to Western ideas of individuals and motivation. The vast majority of North American archaeology, including postprocessual approaches, is modern, not postmodern, in orientation. The relative dearth of theoretical argument positively contributes to diversity and dialogue, but it also may cause North American theory to receive inadequate attention and unfortunate misunderstandings of postmodernism.
is used by most practitioners. Anthropological applications of evolutionary ecology proceed by developing general models-derived from evolutionary theory-that make predictions about behaviors in ecological contexts and evaluating those models with ethnographic and sometimes archaeological data (Winterhalder and Smith 2000) . While earlier archaeological work in this perspective focused on how humans cope with the environment (e.g., the diet breadth model), recent applications also consider social issues, such as sharing and status (Boone 2000) . Some evolutionary ecologists, particularly those doing ethnographic work, focus on notions of evolutionary fitness and the relationship between a behavior and its reproductive consequences (e.g., Hawkes et al. 1995) . In contrast, most archaeological applications are less directly concerned with biological reproduction and instead focus on issues such as foraging strategies. Bamforth (2002) notes that there is sometimes only a weak link between such food-related issues and evolution.
At least in North American archaeology, evolutionary ecology is most commonly applied to studies of hunter-gatherers or small-scale horticulturalists, often involving data from California or the Great Basin, where foraging continued into historic times. For example, Kelly (2001) Many archaeologists who draw on evolutionary ecology also seem open to other modes of inquiry. For example, although Kelly (2000) is quite critical of Darwinian archaeology, he suggests ways in which elements of evolutionary ecology and behavioral archaeology could be used in conjunction with Darwinian approaches, and he specifically draws on behavioral insights into performance characteristics to develop an evolutionary ecological perspective on stone tools. Barlow (2001) , in research on the relative advantages of adding maize to a foraging strategy in the Southwest, also considers issues of gender. And in a very different example, MacDonald (2001) draws on kin selection theory to discuss grief and the treatment of young adults in Hohokam burials, but he explicitly sees his approach as complementary to Marxist and processual interpretations.
Behavioral archaeology was first set forth by Reid, Schiffer, and Rathje (1975) , although today it is most closely associated with Michael Schiffer (1995) , his students, and others who have worked with him at the University of Arizona (e.g., LaMotta and Schiffer 2001; Schiffer and Skibo 1997; Skibo et al. 1995; Walker 2002; Zedenio 1997) . Behaviorism focuses on "the relationship between human behaviors and material culture in all times and all places" (Schiffer 1999:166) , thus it includes modern material culture studies (e.g., Schiffer et al. 1994) . As the name implies, focus is on behavior-not on more abstract concepts such as culture-and the way behavior created the archaeological record. Behavioral archaeology may be most well known for developing methodologies (e.g., the study of formation processes [Schiffer 1987 ] and artifact life histories [Schiffer 1995:55-66] ) that advance our ability to understand the archaeological record and thus reconstruct past behavior. However, especially in recent work, behavioral archaeologists have explicitly turned their attention toward explaining behavior, including issues such as meaning (Schiffer with Miller 1999) , ritual (Walker 2002; Walker and Lucero 2000) , and complex societies (LaMotta and Schiffer 2001). For example, in developing theory to explain artifact variability, Schiffer and Skibo (1997) focus on factors influencing the behavior of producers, including everything from social processes and negotiations to the performance characteristics of the finished artifact.
Schiffer (1999:167) emphasizes that neither behavioral archaeology nor any other theoretical approach is exclusively the best way to address all archaeological problems. He has explicitly tried to build bridges to other approaches in his organization of conferences and edited volumes (1996, 2000 ; see also Skibo and Feinman 1999; Skibo et al. 1995) . Scholars associated with the behavioral perspective also write about other issues (e.g., Skibo and Schiffer 1995). Finally, although relatively few individuals (primarily those cited above) explicitly develop or draw on behavioral theory, many of the methodological and some of the theoretical insights of behavioral archaeology have been widely incorporated into various archaeological approaches, includ-ing concepts of technological strategies (Nelson 1991) and accumulations research (Pauketat 1989; Shott 1996b; Varien and Mills 1997) .
Darwinian archaeology, the most tightly defined perspective, is primarily associated with Robert Dunnell, now retired from the University of Washington (Dunnell 1980 is a key early statement), his students, and now some of his students' students (e.g., Leonard The goal of Darwinian archaeology is to bring Darwinian theory to bear on the archaeological record and thus to replace general concepts of cultural evolution with a more rigorous and scientific understanding of evolution (a recent summary is provided in Leonard 2001) . Focus is on the "replicative success" of components ofphenotypes, what archaeologists commonly call traits. If the traits are functionally advantageous and thus increase reproductive success, then they are subject to positive selection. In contrast, nonfunctional (stylistic) traits are subject to processes such as drift. Many applications of Darwinian archaeology focus on material culture, and some are reviewed in the section on material culture below. A different example is Leonard and Reed's (1993) attempt to explain patterns of aggregation in the Southwest in terms of the differential success of strategies of labor organization.
The sources of variation and processes of selection, as conceptualized in Darwinian archaeology, are the causes of much debate, misunderstanding, and criticism. For example, Bamforth (2002:442) argues that links between archaeological patterns and Darwinian processes are incorrect because selection operates at an individual level but archaeological observations concern remains of aggregate/group processes. He goes on to suggest that Darwinian archaeology does not apply evolutionary theory per se, but instead uses evolution as a metaphor (i.e., traits are like genes). I believe that one reason for the vituperative nature of many debates about Darwinian archaeology is a lack of flexibility. While most other theoretical approaches today are regarded as tools or perspectives useful for addressing certain kinds of issues, Darwinian archaeology is taken as more of an all-or-nothing proposition; one either accepts it (believes in it?) or rejects it.
The problem is compounded by a lack of agreement regarding definitions, especially of widely used terms such as style and function. Darwinian archaeologists have argued that style and function cannot be distinguished a priori but, rather, are identified based on patterns of change over time, which indicate whether a trait is functional and thus subject to selection (Dunnell 1978; Hurt and Rakita 2001). Most non-Darwinian archaeologists seem to ignore these definitions, and recent discussions consider concepts that would be oxymoronic in Darwinian terms, such as the function of style or the style of technologies (Hegmon 1998) . One exception is recent (European) work by Shennan and Wilkinson (2001) , who do not embrace the Darwinian archaeology school but who do explicitly address some of its concepts. Specifically, they conclude that while the idea of style as neutral with regard to selection is a useful heuristic, it does not account for actual frequency distributions and, thus, that there is not a radical difference between functional and stylistic variation. From a different (Darwinian) perspective, Neff (2000) also seems to soften the line between style and function. Specifically, he finds some common ground with evolutionary ecology, concluding that selection need not necessarily act through biological reproduction but, rather, that it can also be a cultural process. These kinds of perspectives are suggestive of an opening of theoretical borders, although Darwinian archaeology remains much more closed than other theoretical approaches.
Processual-Plus
A large majority of North American archaeologists do not associate themselves with one of the three approaches outlined above. Many of these scholars would probably say that they are "generally processual" but also interested in other perspectives, and some explicitly try to combine processual and post-processual insights (e.g., Duke 1995; Preucel 1991 (Redman 1991) . Early statements of postprocessual archaeology (especially Hodder 1982 , Hodder, ed. 1982 Shanks and Tilley 1987a, 1987b) emphasized apparently different approaches involving interpretation and history. Although the idea of (humanistic) interpretation was/is controversial, the postprocessual emphasis on history coincided with a processual turn toward (or back to) the study of specific cases. For example, Braun (1991) argued that questions about why Midwestern Woodland pottery was decorated could only be understood in terms of the specific local and historical setting. More commonly, processualists focused on specific cases as examples of and in relation to the larger context (e.g., Kintigh 1982;  Steponaitis 1981; see Trigger 1989a:368), an approach that today is shared across the theoretical spectrum. General principles are not eschewed, but no longer must a study explicitly address general laws of cultural processes to be considered important and worthy of publication in American Antiquity. As is elaborated below, interest in specific cases fits well with Native Americans' concern with their tribal histories as well as work on cultural affiliation.
Postprocessual archaeology rejected social evolutionary typologies and conceptions of cultures/societies as entities with volition or needs. Instead, emphasis was on individuals, agency, and internal impetus for change. Similarly, many processual archaeologists (e.g., Shennan 1993) Postprocessual archaeology emphasized the importance of symbols and meaning. Whereas earlier processual archaeology had (very gingerly) mentioned cognition and ideas (e.g., Binford's [1962] concept of "ideotechnic" artifacts), postprocessualists declared that meaning is everywhere, in "trash" and subsistence as well as in ritual. As Robb puts it: "The question is not whether we can find symbols archaeologically, but whether we can find anything cultural that is not symbolic" (1998:331 In this and the following section I identify many of the major theoretical directions in North American archaeology today. First I discuss five pervasive issues, most of which have seen cumulative development in the past two decades. Then, in the next section, I characterize recent trends in terms of changing key words and phrases. Conceptually, these two sections cover the same general ground; whether issues are included in the first or second depends primarily on whether they can be characterized in terms of changing key words or phrases. One of the issues that emerges, and that I return to in the final section, is that focus on issues or concepts crosscuts theoretical approaches and thus leads to positive dialogue and dynamic syntheses.
The Past Is Engendered
The archaeology of gender is in many ways paradigmatic ofprocessual-plus archaeology and the theoretical openness that characterizes much of North American archaeology today. Archaeological focus on gender developed concurrently with postprocessualism in the 1980s. Clearly both were part of the same theoretical current; some see the archaeology of gender as part of postprocessual archaeology (e.g., Hodder 1991) , whereas others suggest that it was a separate approach that paralleled and perhaps inspired postprocessual directions (e.g., Wylie 1992). Regardless of its initial relationship with postprocessual archaeology, the long-neglected study of gender in archaeology became enormously popular by the late 1980s; today it is almost mainstream in many theoretical perspectives, although there are still skeptics and unduly harsh reviews. Much of this work is done by Anglo-Saxon researchers working in all parts of the world (see Conkey and Gero 1997) . Feminist perspectives and research on gender are much less popular in other countries and traditions (Coudart 1998 Although it has deep roots in social theory, especially Marxism, the term agency was brought to the fore recently by Giddens, who defines it as individuals' capability of doing things, regardless of their intent: "Agency concerns events of which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently" (1984:9). Dobres and Robb (2000:8-9) offer a list of recent definitions, as well as the useful encapsulation that agency is "a socially significant quality of action." At least for Giddens, agency is inextricably linked to structure, and although he sees structure and agency as having a recursive relationship, his emphasis is primarily on how structure is created and perpetuated, the process he calls structuration. Bourdieu (1977, 1990) and Ortner (1984) emphasize practice, which Ortner has argued is almost anything people do that has political implications. Practice is embedded in structure, and it is through practice that agents reproduce or transform structure. However, discussions of agency sometimes forget this embeddedness (as Wiessner [2002] notes) and equate agency with the strategies or intentions of relatively unconstrained self-interested individuals. Practice and agency have to do with similarly conceptualized processes, but the terms emphasize different components of these processes. Agency is more "behind the scenes," in that it has to do with capability and is sometimes (I think wrongly) associated with motivation. In contrast, practice refers directly to what people do. Focus on practice, rather than agency, leads to a more dynamic and humanized picture of people's activities and of the relations among individuals, institutions, and structure (Dobres and Robb 2000:4-5). The fact that archaeologists often focus only on agency suggests that the insights of practice theory-especially the recursive relationships among practice, agency, and structure-are sometimes overlooked, a theme I assess below.
Explicit discussions of agency in North American archaeology are probably most common in accounts of leadership and inequality. Pauketat (1994) has argued for the importance of elite-controlled ideology and symbolism in the rise of Mississippian chiefdoms. However, in more recent work (2000) he also considers how the practices of commoners and emergent elite resulted in the construction of Mississippian mounds and social hierarchies, even if the end-a powerful chiefdom-was not intended by all agents. He emphasizes that practices were based in the established structure but that, as the scale changed, the structure was transformed. Thus, Pauketat specifically draws on practice theory (not just agency) and attributes change to more than elite manipulations. In work that focuses on less complex traditions, Cobb and Garrow (1996; Cobb 2000) draw on ideas of agency and structure to understand the extent to which local developments were and were not drawn into Mississippian politics. Smith (1992a) draws on Giddens to argue that Mississippian calendrical devices can be understood as authoritative resources and structural principles. Saitta ( Discussions of agency are also prevalent in studies of leadership and social change in the Southwest. Schachner (2001) identifies contexts in which agents were able to instigate social and especially ritual change, but reversal of those changes suggests that the leaders were not able to institutionalize them. His account specifically focuses on the recursive relationship between agency and structure, in that agents' practices-involving Giddensian rules and resources-are derived from and may transform structure. Varien (1999) draws on Giddens's concept of structuration to conceptualize how agency (in the form of residential mobility) was enabled and constrained by the structure (i.e., the land tenure system) and how the result (settlement on the landscape) became part of and eventually contributed to the transformation of the structure. In contrast to many archaeological applications of practice theory, Varien's account gives particular emphasis to structure.
Agency is a component of the corporate/network models of leadership developed by Blanton et al. (1996) and recently applied to understanding the pithouse-to-pueblo transition (Feinman et al. 2000) and other aspects of southwestern (Mills 2000) and Mississippian (Trubitt 2000) prehistory, although these applications do not all explicitly discuss agency. An important issue that could be explored from this perspective concerns agency in different kinds of leadership systems. That is, it is relatively easy for A different perspective on agency is being explored by a small number of archaeologists using agent-based modeling. In these computer models, agents (not necessarily conceptualized as individuals) collect information, make decisions, act, and can learn and change as a result of their actions (Kohler 2000) . Although agent-based modeling is not about agency per se, it does have theoretical relevance. Specifically, at least some agent-based models are generative, in that agents' actions contribute to structure, which then sets the stage for further actions, a process not unlike Giddens's structuration. Agentbased models are currently being developed to explore the dynamics of settlement in two parts of the Southwest ( In various forms, agency is everywhere in North American archaeology today. Many archaeologists explicitly discuss theoretical concepts of agency and practice; others (especially in gender studies) use the concepts more implicitly. In reviewing some of this work, I have considered concepts of agency that are linked to practice theory to be particularly praiseworthy. This is because these studies help us to understand the ways that agency-part of what makes us human-is culturally constituted and thus is not immutable. In general, different perspectives on agency seem to coexist with little rancor but also with regrettably little dialogue. That is, different researchers or approaches utilize different concepts or definitions of agency, but discussion (or even acknowledgment) of those differences is minimal. Thus, the potential for theoretical dynamism exists in the varied approaches to the same word or concept, but it has yet to be fully developed.
For at least two reasons, North American archaeology has something special to offer to archaeological interests in agency. First, because of the richness of the record and quality of dating, there are many cases in which we can observe the details of practice, even cases where efforts to instigate changes seem to have failed (e.g., Schachner 2001) . Second, because much of North American archaeology is about times and places in which institutionalized inequality was not prevalent, it gives us the opportunity to conceptualize practice and agency in a world very unlike our own.
Is Anything Not Symbolic?
An emphasis on symbols and meaning was advocated by postprocessual archaeology, and, as discussed above, consideration of these topics has been incorporated into the processual-plus mainstream and into behavioral approaches ( 1999) and that all behavior is symbolically mediated and is both action and meaning (Trigger 1998a ). Thus, although most of these symbolically inclined North Americanists would not self-identify as poststructuralists (though see Dunham 1999) , they do have something in common with the approach Robb (1998) calls "symbols as tesserae."
North Americanists' treatment of symbols and meaning can be considered in terms of at least three general realms. The first, and probably the broadest, is that meaning is now seen as intrinsic to many social and economic processes, sometimes as part of ritual behavior or religion. This is probably most apparent in varied approaches to leadership and the rise of political systems. For example, following earlier work by Judge (1989) , the spectacular development of Chaco Canyon (northern New Mexico) and the surrounding regional system in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries is viewed at least in part as the rise of a complex ritual system, involving pilgrimages into the canyon (Renfrew 2001 ; see summary in Mills 2002) . While enormous effort was devoted toward the procurement and production of goods that were moved into Chaco Canyon, relatively little material (other than ritually charged turquoise) moved out (Mills 2002 Lekson 1999) .
A second realm in which meaning and symbols are given considerable attention is in interpretations of all kinds and scales of archaeological evidence, ranging from portable material culture to architecture and landscapes. Material culture is discussed more specifically below; here I emphasize how analyses attempt to interpret the general and specific meanings incorporated into that material, for example, the Ramey Incised pottery discussed above, the ideology associated with southwestern Salado Polychrome (Crown 1994), and the metaphoric roots of Mesa Verde ceramic designs (Ortman 2000) . Production of material culture is also sometimes understood in terms of the meaning of that material-for example, the ritual demand for glaze ware pottery (Spielmann 1998 (Spielmann , 2002 Some of these issues are the subject of another article in this issue (see also Ferguson 1996b) . Here I focus on how current theory is related to these political developments, and I emphasize that the relationship is complex and multicausal. In many ways, awareness of "whose ancestors we are studying" has made archaeologists more critically aware of possible biases and the implications of archaeological research, although formal critical theory (e.g., the work of Habermas) is not often explicitly discussed regarding pre-Columbian North American archaeology (but see Leone and Preucel 1992).
As Trigger (1980) made clear, New Archaeology, in its search for general laws, often treated native peoples as objects of research or sources of data. He suggests that more concern with the history of native peoples might help move archaeologists away from this detached view. His suggestion was applied by Duke (1995) , whose emphasis on local history in southwestern Colorado is closely linked to the interest of local Ute people-who participated in his fieldwork-in their own history and ancestors. History has received much more archaeological (and general anthropological) attention since the 1980s. As I discussed above, the processual archaeology of the 1980s included growing interest in particular cases in lieu of general laws, and postprocessual archaeology explicitly emphasized the importance of history.
Concern with particular histories is also linked to the rekindling of archeological interest in how people relate to the landscape, including issues of place, abandonment, and migration. Among other points, recent studies of abandonment now empha- (Shennan 1989 Among the ideas and terminology that have come to replace cultural evolution are "paths to complexity" (see also Hayden [1995] on pathways to power) and "cycling." One widely applied example of the former is based on the distinction between corporate and network/exclusionary modes of political action (Blanton et al. 1996) . These are described in more detail below; here the point is that the switch from corporate to network strategies is not necessarily unidirectional-nor is one necessarily more complex than the other. The concept of cycling has been applied in various contexts in eastern North America. Cobb (1991) views the long-term development of Late Archaic, Hopewell, and Mississippian exchange systems in terms of Braudel's three-level cycle of historical change (structure, conjuncture, and event). Focusing on the Mississippian, Anderson (1994, 1996) argues that cycling, specifically the rise and collapse of complex chiefdoms, is an inherent property of chiefdoms. Although Anderson's model is not universally accepted (e.g., Scarry 1999) , nonlinear developments-such as fission-fusiondo seem to characterize many parts of the Mississippian world (Blitz 1999).
There are exceptions to my generalization about the shift away from concern with the evolution of culture. For example, Richerson et al. (2001) develop a general explanation for the origins of agriculture in the Holocene (the processes they discuss are world-wide, but they include some North American cases). And Smith (1992b) considers the development of early agriculture in eastern North America as coevolution (see also Rindos 1984) . These exceptions make clear that there has not been an absolute rejection of the concept of the evolution of culture per se. Rather, the term evolution is being applied with more discrimination, so that every change or transformation is no longer considered to be "evolutionary" (see also Trigger's [1998b] Archaeological interest in kinship has been moderate, at best (e.g., Howell and Kintigh 1996) . However, a few recent studies that have addressed the topic conceptualize kinship not as a system to be classified but, rather, as an organizational strategy, a perspective consonant with recent work in social and kinship theory. For example, Jones (1996) Although the difference between social organization and political organization may seem to be splitting hairs, the point is that the political modes comprise sets of leadership strategies that crosscut various kinds of societies and may coexist in a given social formation. Another important aspect of the corporate/network distinction is that it directs attention toward processes of leadership rather than assuming that leadership is somehow preestablished by the social structure; even when leadership is institutionalized it is not passively perpetuated.
A related development is an increasing interest in the dynamics of power. Most North Americanistsalthough they seem to be aware of Foucault's work and various conceptions of power (Wolf 1990 An important component of the shift away from the study of "the social organization" is the disaggregation of its various components (see Mills 2000) . One example is Saitta's (1997) Marxist argument that developments at Chaco Canyon were the result of the communal appropriation of labor, rather than being controlled by ritual specialists, who had power in different realms. The concept of "heterarchy" similarly directs attention toward processes of leadership rather than organizational types, although it has seen few applications to the nonstate societies of North America (one exception is Rautman 1998) .
Finally, chapters in Diehl 2000 consider the "costs and benefits," to various social actors, of hierarchical strategies.
Types -+ Dimensions
As New Archaeology/processual archaeologists directed attention toward understanding and analyzing artifact style in relation to social organization, many eschewed typological classifications in favor of attribute analysis (e.g., Plog 1980) . More recently there has been a moderation of this approach and a renewed interest in artifact typologies (e.g., Duff 1996) . Today types, attributes, or both may be the basis of analysis, depending on the question at hand. This reconsideration of artifact typologies, in conjunction with recent developments in social theory, has also moved archaeologists away from the typological classification of social forms or practices and toward an emphasis on understanding the relevant variables.
A prime example is movement away from Service's (1971) bands-tribes-chiefdoms-states evolutionary sequence. Instead, there is much more focus on relevant dimensions that may crosscut these categories (see Feinman and Neitzel 1984) , such as organizational strategies and forms of power (the corporate and network modes), as well as alternative forms of leadership, such as heterarchy and the communal appropriation of labor (discussed above). This shift has resulted in a welcome end to acrimonious debates about the presence or absence of hierarchy or whether one prehistoric case is more or less complex than another. For example, debate (centered around the sites of Chavez Pass and Grasshopper) about institutionalized social inequalities in late preHispanic western Pueblos has been replaced by the conclusion that the Pueblos were both egalitarian and hierarchical (McGuire and Saitta 1996; Plog 1995) . In a different approach, Nelson (1995) compares developments at La Quemada (northern Mexico) and Chaco Canyon, concludes that they were complex in different ways, and sets forth general dimensions of complexity.
Research on other kinds of topics has similarly involved a shift from types to dimensions. The organization of production/specialization had long been characterized in terms of categories/types such as households and workshops. However, since Costin's (1991) seminal essay, much work has focused instead on the dimensions of specialization. Whereas Costin's emphasis was on high degrees of specialization-such as those associated with states-her general approach has been both modified and advanced in applications to the different kinds of specialization seen in North America (e.g., Crown and Mills 1995; Hegmon et al. 1997) .
Archaeologists' understanding of mobility is also becoming increasingly multidimensional (see Rocek 1996) , in part building on Binford's (1980) (1993, 1995) and Ames (1995) consider various aspects of production (controlled by chiefs and at the household level, respectively) in chiefly societies. Interestingly, although there is much interest in the nature of complexity in the Southwest, the concept of chiefdom is rarely invoked because leadership seems to have taken different forms (Mills 2000) . This selective use of a potentially controversial concept suggests a theoretical maturity, and it is likely that work on the rich database on North American chiefdoms-which often persisted into protohistoric periods-will advance archaeologists' understanding of this social organizational form.
Eschewing Particularistic Explanations -+

Migration and Diffusion
In their quest for general laws of cultural processes, some New Archaeologists rejected "particularistic" explanations based on diffusion and migration. Although their reasoning made theoretical sense-diffusion is not an explanation-the result was a lack of attention to significant events such as large-scale population movements (seeAnthony 1990). Perhaps as part of a renewed processual-plus interest in particular cases, archaeologists have again turned considerable attention toward the movement of people and apparent spread of traits.
Numerous studies have documented prehistoric migrations and abandonments in NorthAmerica. Furthermore, rather than using migration simply as an explanation for change, much attention is now focused on understanding the social processes of pop- (1996) argue that tactics such as aggregation and exchange were selected for during a favorable climatic period and that these tactics made the societies of northernArizona and southern Utah particularly vulnerable to later climatic downturns. The mathematical and computational complexity involved in agent-based modeling and complexity theory suggests that neither will become mainstream applications in archaeology. Still, they are important as new ways of conceptualizing processes of change. In addition, they may cause archaeologists to reconsider concepts of explanation (an issue also being explored by philosophers of science [Morrison and Morgan 1999] ). That is, in these approaches to modeling, change is often an emergent property rather than the effect of one variable on another. The result is that there is no simple answer to the "why" questions, but there is enhanced understanding.
Rituals as
Humans in the Environment -+ Humans as Part of the Environment
The environment has become an increasingly complex concept, in social theory and politics (Castree and Braun 2001) , and for North American archaeologists. No longer is the (natural) environment simply a setting for human activity, a variable in explanatory models, or a source of constraints. Archaeologists' theories about the environment and humans' part in it are influenced in part by developments in the "new ecologies," which emphasize processes of disequilibrium and instability (see review in Zimmerer 1994) .
This increasingly complicated understanding of "environment" has several implications in North American archaeological theory. It is increasingly evident that even the relatively small-scale preColumbian societies of North America had a major impact on the environment (e.g., Kohler and Matthews 1988; Minnis 1985; Redman 1999) . And while impact sometimes involved negative processes such as erosion, deforestation, and salinization, it is also becoming clear that "impact" is not always the most appropriate concept. Humans contributed to the ecology of which they were a part, for example, through deliberate burning (Delcourt et al. 1998), and in least some cases, human practices may have increased biological diversity (Minnis and Elisens 2000). Not only is "the environment" partly a human creation, it is also conceived as having inseparable natural and cultural components, in that it is always occupied by other humans. Research on environmental subjects increasingly is linked to cultural concepts of symbols and meaning. Some earlier work on domestication (e.g., Ford 1977 ) explored how changes in humans' use of plants involved changing cultural concepts. Recent theorizing regarding landscapes takes this perspective even further. As Knapp and Ashmore put it, no longer are landscapes/environments simply backdrops: "Landscape is an entity that exists by virtue of its being perceived, experi-enced, and contextualized by people" (1999:1) . This theoretical perspective is given practical application by the U.S. Forest Service, which has recently considered how landscapes (rather than arbitrarily defined districts) might be used as management/planning units that are sensitive to environmental-cultural dynamics (Duke 1995:209) . Finally, the environment is becoming a focus for some archaeologists (e.g., van der Leeuw and Redman 2002) to expand the reach of archaeology, through interdisciplinary studies and efforts to use archaeological (especially long-term diachronic) perspectives to address issues of contemporary relevance.
Epistemology
In contrast to the heyday of the New Archaeology, epistemological debates have been relatively uncommon in recent North American archaeology. Discussions about the virtues of various theoretical perspectives (reviewed above) have primarily focused on the nature of human society and culture change and on how they should be conceptualized. Thus, these discussions have mostly been about ontology, though they have epistemological implications with regard to the ways issues should be investigated.
In earlier decades North American archaeologists often formally applied the deductive method, evaluating explicitly stated hypotheses (and often also null hypotheses) by means of explicitly stated test implications (e.g., Hill 1970; Lightfoot and Feinman 1982) . Recent approaches tend to take a less formal approach. It is still common for research questions, expectations, and means of evaluation to be made clear, but the labels of the scientific method seem to be less important, and the structure of investigation is less assertively deductive. Instead, accounts of research tend to move fairly freely among research questions, relevant information, and new interpretations and questions. For example, Whalen and Minnis ( This moderate view is supported by recent statements by Wylie (1992 Wylie ( , 1996 Wylie ( , 2000 ; see also Brumfiel 1996) about the "evidential constraints" that the archaeological record places on our interpretations. While all data are dependent on some theory, the point is to evaluate one theory with data that are primarily dependent on another theory. Multiple lines of evidence generally produce better evidential constraints, but Wylie reasonably argues that there is no single formula that should be applied in all cases. Rather, focus should be on assessing the independence or interdependence of various lines of evidence for a particular problem.
Finally, heated debate ensued as a result of Binford's (2001) criticism of the idea that the archaeological record should be used to evaluate theories-derived from all sorts of perspectivesabout the nature of human behavior. By working in this perspective, researchers merely focus on how they can "interpret" their data, an approach Binford considers to be deplorable. Instead, he argues that archaeology's subject matter should be the archaeological record; if archaeologists properly focus on explaining the archaeological record, they will avoid the problem of data being theory dependent. Because Binford used recent work by Odell as a foil for his criticisms, Odell (2001) countered, arguing that good research problems can be derived from many sources and that the key is reasonable and independent testing. Although this exchange was very recent, it is my impression that it will not turn into a continuing debate. Rather, depending on the issue at hand, most archaeologists will sometimes ask questions about the nature of the archaeological record and sometimes use the archaeological record to evaluate larger issues. Both kinds of questions are part of behavioral archaeology (e.g., work on site formation processes and on meaning). And although most of the processual-plus work I have reviewed here involves the second kind of question (i.e., issues beyond the archaeological record), many of the same researchers also ask the first kind of question, when appropriate. For example, Pauketat (1989, 1994, 2000) This dearth of explicit discussion does not mean that North American archaeology has no theoretical perspective but, rather, that it is often taken for granted. My goal in this section is to briefly characterize NorthAmerican archaeology in terms of recent social theory, a discussion that requires some background and at least basic definitions of the various "posts." Although the paragraphs that follow (modernism explained in one paragraph, poststructuralism and postmodernism in two) may seem elementary to some, I am convinced that they are necessary. I have too often heard otherwise wellinformed scholars assume that postmodernism is either everything new (often everything new they do not like) or everything critical of science.
Modernism, a product of the Enlightenment, is based on the belief that the world is knowable through reason and that "reason advances knowledge; knowledge enables science; and science serves the liberatory aims of society" (Peet 1998:194) . Modernist approaches-including Newtonian physics, Dar-winian evolution, Freudian psychoanalysis, and structuralism-seek understanding and explanation in terms of underlying principles. Marxism is also moder in its emphasis on progress, though because of its historical and dialectical approaches, Marxism is less positivist and less concerned with universal truths than most other modem approaches. Moder art, such as Cubism, attempted to "reduce painting to a few basic principles accessible only to the intellect" (Cassou 1965:269) .
The definitiveness and optimism of modernism were challenged early in the twentieth century, intellectually by work on entropy, quantum mechanics, and relativity theory and more generally by stark realizations of the destructive potential of science. Physicists themselves began to declare that they should "abandon all attempts to construct perceptual models," renounced "the classical ideal of causality," and argued that what they observe "is not nature itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning" (Best and Kellner Poststructuralism overlaps to some extent with postmodernism, which is broader and perhaps even more difficult to define. In contrast to modernism, which seeks to understand underlying and generalizable processes and is sometimes referred to as "totalizing," postmodernism (as set forth by Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition [1984] ) is concerned with multiple surficial representations. Postmoder knowledge also emphasizes differences, including acknowledgment and tolerance of the incommensurable. Postmoder knowledge is not just the purview of experts but is a product of many little narratives and peoples' practices and interactions at a local scale. The point is not that narratives and representations can somehow be decoded and stripped away to reveal a "true" underlying reality Is "not postmoder" equivalent to moder? In the case of North American archaeology, the answer is, "Yes, generally." Emphasis on generalizable principles and scientific reasoning (characteristic especially of earlier processualism as well as evolutionary ecology and behavioral and Darwinian archaeologies) is definitely modem. The processual-plus interest in specific cases as they relate to the larger context or in comparative perspectives is also generally moder, in that it involves a search for underlying truths. A modernist approach is often taken for granted, enabling researchers to proceed with their particular studies (in the tradition of normal science) but also disabling their ability to imagine other ways of viewing the world, especially when "postmodernist" becomes the appellation for new and often misunderstood approaches, issues I address in the final section.
Conclusion
In this review I have grouped most North American archaeology into three self-identified schools-evolutionary ecology, behavioral, and Darwinian-and a broad array that I label processual-plus. Combining all four perspectives, there is considerable use of various kinds of evolutionary theory as well as practice theory and the concept of agency. North American archaeologists also are contributing to many theoretically interesting issues, including gender, symbols and meaning, new approaches to conceptualizing society and material culture, and localnative histories. However, in contrast to the New Archaeology of several decades ago, and in contrast to some postprocessual work in Britain, North American archaeology today involves relatively little discussion of general theory and relatively few attempts to build or contribute to such theory. North American archaeology is not atheoretical, but most North American archaeologists today seem to be more interested in applications-and in exploring the archaeological record and its implications-than in theory alone (see also Barker 1999 Lack of focus on general theory contributes to open-mindedness, on the one hand, but at another level this lack of focus can also disguise the importance of theory. Theory is omnipresent; it is how we make sense of the world, even (or especially) if it is not explicit. This is an issue particularly regarding modernism and postmodernism: many North American archaeologists seem to take a modem perspective for granted, as the only way of knowing the world, and dismiss postmodernism (sometimes assumed to be a synonym for "antiscience") out of hand. The result is that powerful and relevant ideas from postmodernism are not brought to bear, even when they might be particularly relevant to North American issues. Examples include perspectives on local knowledge and incommensurability, especially with regard to Native American views of the past, and alternative approaches to causality, especially with regard to new techniques of modeling.
There are many developments in North American archaeology that are of broad relevance worldwide, at both theoretical and applied levels. For example, the North American ethnographic and archaeological records provide great detail on various forms of social complexity in nonstate societies; these include a variety of chiefdoms (Mississippian and on the western coast) and alternative complicated leadership strategies in the Southwest. The great detail and precise dating possible in some parts of NorthAmerica have facilitated careful investigations of agency and practice, as well as gender issues. The detailed record and links to ethnography have contributed to important studies of symbols and meaning, in portable material culture, architecture, and the environment and landscape. The list could go on, but while there is a great deal to praise in North American archaeology, I fear that it is not getting the recognition it deserves outside of North America, perhaps because of a lack of attention to general theory. It is my hope that this review will draw more attention to recent developments in NorthAmerican archaeology, especially regarding theoretically relevant issues and applications. I also hope to prod North Americanists to direct a little more focus toward general theory, not to open the floodgates of argument but, rather, to become aware of the way theory conditions the manner in which we see the world.
